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Laurence BonJour divides approaches to a priori justification into three kinds.
Quine’s radical empiricism denies the existence of any special category of a pri-
ori justification; moderate empiricism attempts to explain a priori justification
in terms of something like knowledge of meaning or grasp of concepts; and
rationalism postulates an irreducible ‘rational insight’ into the nature of real-
ity. The positions therefore form a familiar trio of eliminativism, reductionism
and anti-reductionism concerning a priori justification. BonJour’s interesting
and (in the present philosophical climate) unusual project is to defend ration-
alism, the anti-reductionist position. Rationalism says that we have an ability
to ‘directly or intuitively see or grasp or apprehend … a necessary fact about
the nature or structure of reality’ (pp. –). ‘An apparent rational insight,’ he
says, ‘purports to be nothing less than a direct insight into the necessary char-
acter of reality’ (p. ). Two clarifications will help to mark out the distinctive
character of this view: first, that rational insight is fallible; and second, that
although BonJour carefully distinguishes the concepts of necessity and aprior-
ity, he none the less claims that rational insight yields a priori knowledge of
necessary truths only. On his view, the contingent a priori does not exist,
although empirical necessities do.
BonJour argues for his rationalism by first presenting arguments against
both moderate and radical empiricism. He then describes the rationalist view,
considers various objections to it, and ends with a chapter proposing a novel
rationalist solution to the problem of induction. The critique of radical empir-
icism in chapter three is based on a discussion of Quine’s views in ‘Two Dog-
mas of Empiricism’. BonJour thinks that it is only the last section of this paper
which contains any really threat to rationalism; the first sections (on analytic-
ity) only touch on the idea of a priori justification in so far as all a priori
knowledge is knowledge of analytic truth (a moderate empiricist view). Since
Quine is really arguing with Carnap in this paper and not with a BonJour-style
rationalist, this emphasis is not surprising. BonJour finds the critique of analy-
ticity unpersuasive, and the behaviourism and naturalism which underlie
them question-begging. The epistemological arguments from the end of ‘Two
Dogmas’ get similar treatment. The Duhemian picture of science sketched
there tells against a priori justification only if it is assumed that ‘epistemic
rationality is concerned solely with adjusting one’s beliefs to experience’
(p. ) and this is one of the questions at issue. The doctrine of the indetermi-
nacy of translation is dismissed too as question-begging, and naturalized epis-
temology is charged with not being epistemology at all.
His final point, first touched on at the beginning of the book and returned
to in this chapter, is that Quine’s position on the a priori eventually gives rise
to a general scepticism, since the epistemic justification for moving beyond
propositions about mere sense-experience must ultimately depend on a priori
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principles. BonJour makes an interesting point here about the dependence of
empirical justification on a priori justification, but the point would surely have
little force against someone who has turned his back so completely on tradi-
tional epistemology as Quine has done. BonJour does not seem to have fully
appreciated the way in which Quine would simply reject the traditional episte-
mologist’s talk of epistemic justification.
From a Quinean perspective, calling the Quinean approach ‘question-beg-
ging’ misses the point. Quine is not trying to present an argument for his radi-
cal conclusions from uncontroversial premisses; rather, he is using a variety of
rhetorical and dialectical methods to persuade philosophers that their old
ways of thinking are, in a certain way, empty. The essence of this challenge is
not that ‘analytic’ or ‘a priori’ do not make any literal sense, or that they are
wholly unintelligible. The point is rather that our knowledge will not be
advanced by thinking in this traditional way; our scientific and other theories
should select the concepts they need on pragmatic/empirical grounds, and the
old concepts of a priori knowledge and epistemic justification have not yielded
sufficient empirical/scientific or any other kind of epistemic fruit. So the Qui-
nean urges that we do away with them, and replace them with something likely
to be more fruitful. The Quinean certainly employs the idea of ‘our knowl-
edge’, but need not be particularly insistent that it is all ‘empirical’ in the sense
the rationalist intends (pace BonJour, p. ). Rather, rejecting the a priori/
empirical distinction involves rejecting both sides of the distinction as the
rationalist and the moderate empiricist construe them. (This is the point
Quine is making at the end of ‘Carnap on Logical Truth’ with the image of the
‘pale grey fabric’ of our knowledge, black with fact and white with convention,
but containing no wholly white threads and no wholly black ones.)
I’m not saying that Quine is right and BonJour is wrong; it’s just that calling
Quine’s approach ‘question-begging’ does not help us understand what is
wrong with it. Quine challenged philosophers to think in a wholly different
way about knowledge; to respond, ‘But that’s question-begging!’ seems to mis-
construe the kind of challenge being made. The underlying problem, I suspect,
is that BonJour lacks sufficient sympathy with Quine’s philosophy to be able
to engage with it in a creative way. There is no real attempt to get inside the
view and see what is at its heart and what is peripheral. Quine’s views, BonJour
says, are ‘very difficult to take seriously’ (p. ); Quine has ‘failed to fully
appreciate the dialectical situation’ (p. ); his ‘grasp of the main concepts and
distinctions in this area … is far from sure’ (p. ); and the arguments of ‘Two
Dogmas’, when not ‘loose and metaphorical’ (p. ) are ‘totally lacking in
force’ (p. ). What emerges is a picture of Quine’s contribution to this debate
as almost entirely worthless: a reader ignorant of Quine’s views would be
obliged to conclude that they were barely worth discussing. It seems to me that
this is not the way to get the best out of a debate with one’s philosophical
opponents.
BonJour’s discussion of Quine, then, is not one of the better parts of his
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interesting book. So let us move on to the theory with which BonJour has just
a little more sympathy, moderate empiricism. BonJour actually thinks that
there is, strictly speaking, no one theory which counts as moderate empiri-
cism, since there is a ‘stunning diversity of distinct and not obviously compat-
ible views’ of the central concept, analyticity (p. ). And he argues that when
clarified, the notion of analyticity is either epistemologically irrelevant, or so
unclear as to be beyond repair. He carefully distinguishes various things which
have been meant by ‘analytic’, and concludes that even when the notions are
not objectionable in themselves (for example, Frege’s notion of analyticity)
they are no help to epistemology.
Is BonJour right that there is no epistemologically workable conception of
analyticity? Light has been shed on these matters by Paul Boghossian’s 
paper, ‘Analyticity Reconsidered’ (Noûs , pp. –). Boghossian distin-
guishes a metaphysical conception of analyticity — truth in virtue of
meaning—from an epistemological conception— justification in virtue of
knowledge of meaning. Boghossian and BonJour (p. ) would agree that the
metaphysical conception is hopeless; nothing can be true purely in virtue of
what it means. But the epistemological conception is a different idea: this is the
idea that one is justified in believing an analytic truth simply because one
knows what the words it contains mean. One’s knowledge of the meanings of
one’s words is part of what explains how one is justified in believing certain
propositions. The approach then adopts Frege’s definition of analyticity: a sen-
tence is analytic when it is can be transformed into a logical truth by the sub-
stitution of synonyms. If knowledge of synonymy is a priori, then all that
needs to be explained is the apriority of knowledge of logical truth. Boghos-
sian defends the idea that logical truths implicitly define the logical constants
occurring therein, and therefore knowing a logical truth is knowing a defini-
tion, and thus can be a priori. 
Obviously, many details need to be spelled out, and the project is not with-
out its difficulties. But on the face of it, Boghossian’s proposal is a challenge to
BonJour’s claim that there is no clear and epistemologically relevant concep-
tion of analyticity which is a candidate for doing the job of explaining a priori
knowledge for the moderate empiricist. However, BonJour does argue that
neither the idea of implicit definition nor the idea of knowledge of meaning
can play any role in explaining a priori knowledge. He objects to the appeal to
implicit definition on the grounds that one’s knowledge that a sentence S is an
implicit definition of term T occurring in it cannot explain one’s justified
belief in the truth of S, since this belief is presupposed in advance by the defi-
nition of T (pp. –). And he further objects to the idea that knowledge of
meaning can be used to explain a priori justification. ‘Such a claim could only
be defended,’ he says, ‘by giving some articulated account of just how justifica-
tion is supposed to result solely from meaning’ (p. ). Later he says the mis-
take in the appeal to analyticity ‘is to think that it conveys any epistemological
insight into how the truth of the proposition is seen or grasped or appre-
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hended’ (p. ). But how can it be no part of my justification for my belief that
bachelors are unmarried that I know that ‘bachelor’ means unmarried man,
and furthermore that this knowledge is, in the relevant sense, independent of
experience? It is not clear why the moderate empiricist should not have the
beginnings of an ‘articulated account’ here: the account of my justification for
believing an a priori truth appeals in part to some further knowledge, the
knowledge I have of the meanings of my words (or the concepts I possess).
The account cannot, of course, stop there; it must also give an account of
knowledge of meaning or possession of concepts, and this is a major task. But
at least some of the outlines of an articulated epistemological account seem to
be in place: explaining how we know certain propositions a priori in terms of
how we know other things, the meanings of our words. Why does BonJour
insist that this provides no epistemic illumination?
One reason might be that the moderate empiricist will ultimately have to
appeal to something like an irreducible ‘rational insight’ into meanings or
concepts, and it is this idea that is doing all the epistemological work. But even
if this were so, it is not an objection to the idea that the a priori justification of
some beliefs appeals to knowledge of meaning. For this is just an aspect of the
familiar foundationalist picture that some beliefs are justified in terms of other
beliefs, and at bottom there are some basic beliefs which are not justified in
terms of any others. On the moderate empiricist’s view, these are the beliefs
about the meanings of our words. On BonJour’s view, these are the truths we
just see with our rational insight. The moderate empiricist can say that we
know that nothing can be red and green all over ultimately because we know
certain truths about the meanings of the words ‘red’ and ‘green’, etc.; the
rationalist, on the other hand, says that we can ‘just see’ that it is necessarily
true. (And the radical empiricist will say, in Quine’s words, that ‘there is no
real difference between these two pseudo-doctrines’.)
An apparent advantage of the moderate empiricist picture as I have
described it is that (like the foundationalist about empirical knowledge) it tries
to tell a story about the structures or mechanisms by which we are justified in
believing things. The appeal to rational insight, by contrast, seems to give out a
little too soon. BonJour does a good job of persuading us that we should free
ourselves of the prejudice that rational insight is ‘mysterious’. But a genuinely
articulated account should be able to say more about this insight than the rela-
tively few remarks BonJour offers. For example, we are not told in any
principled way which kinds of necessary truth can be justified by rational
insight (except that not all of them can, given the existence of empirical neces-
sities). It would be good to hear more from BonJour about the ‘moving parts’
of rational insight—especially given his conviction that knowledge of mean-
ing contributes nothing to a priori justification. Without this, we can throw
his question back to him: ‘How exactly does rational insight contribute to a
priori justification in the way that knowledge of meaning does not?’
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